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Abstract 
We consider the limit s to traditional finance in evaluating power projects and investigate the role biases and heuristics used by 
individuals and institutions play in investment decisions, particularly those affecting less familiar, lower-carbon electricity 
generation.  
 
Traditional finance relies on the principles and results of modern portfolio theory, such as the efficient market hypothesis, which 
tends to describe investment results in terms of mean percentage return, statistical risk (e.g. standard deviation), and reward -to-
risk ratios.  For power projects, firms consider various financial criteria for comparing projects opportunities with unequal 
lifetimes.  To forecast financial criteria for project opportunities, firms will n ormally project the cash flow profile, often using 
Monte Carlo simulations given the volatility of some point estimations. In addition, real options analysis can be integrated if the 
relevant option (abandonment, expansion, flexibility) value may be significant. Many potential risks already incorporat ed in the 
traditional finance prospective include: business and commercial risk, country (or political risk), exchange rate and interest rate 
risk, inflation and liquidity risk.   
 
Rather than assuming all investors are rational and all relevant facts will  be interpreted correctly, institutional behavioral finance 
assumes firms make decisions according to their own objectives and constraints. Project decisions are affected by both the 
institutional framework and individual behavior. Behavioral characteristi cs can affect decision-making by contributing to biased 
forecasts, especially in those institutions or projects for which decision -making power is highly concentrated. Specific biases 
affecting power projects include: representativeness, overconfidence, anchoring-and-adjustment, aversion to ambiguity, 
endorsement effect, and loss aversion.  
 
Project decision -makers may not fully incorporate financial projections, as rather than researching or trusting that information 
they are forming own rules developed through experiments, making investment decision that is most prominent, and relying on 
heuristics.  We analyze the risks and opportunities for shareholders, creditors, and equipment vendors in moving from the 
traditional to the behavioral model, with a speci al emphasis on ‘newer’ investment decisions found in lower-carbon generation 
such as renewable or advanced coal and CCS technologies.  
 
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd . All rights reserved  
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Behavioral Fi nance, Lower Carbon Power, Climate Change  
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 -787-897-5366.  
E-mail address : x.liang@jbs.cam.ac.uk. 
c 9 Elsevier Ltd.
Energy Procedia 1 (2009) 4495–4502
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
doi:10.1016/j.egypro.2009.02.267
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
2 Author name / Energy Procedia 00 ( 2008) 000 –000 
1. Introduction 
Traditional finance assumes investors are rational and all relevant information can be interpreted correctly, so firms  
are able to select the most efficient portfolio – a combination of projects with the highest NPV at a given risk level –  
in their capital rationing process. In reality, it is always difficult for firm -level decision makers to only consider 
traditional finance factors independent of institutional and personal attachments , objectives and constraints. For 
example, some firms may require a project generate  sufficient cash flow to pay  off debt at certain dates, as  the  
shortfall risk can be catastrophic. As a result, some efficient investment opportuniti es are eliminated (sacrificing 
excess return) in order to meet  minimal return objectives.  
     Institutional project decision s relate  to both the institutional framework (organi zational structure) and individual 
behaviors. Individual behavioral characteristics can affect decision -making and contribute to bias ed forecasts, 
especially in those institutions or projects of which decision -making power is highly concentrated, which is common 
in most Chinese firms. Project decision -makers may not fully inco rporate financial projections; rather than 
rese arching or trusting that information they may  form their own rules developed based on  their own experience and 
relying on heuristics. A few behavioral patterns can be applied in exploring decision -makers’ characteristics in the 
Chinese power sector.  
We investigate whether investors and decision makers in power companies are affected by behavioral traps which 
have alre ady b een found in financial market s, such as representativeness, overconfidence, anchoring, aversion -to -
ambiguity, naive diversification, end orsement  effect, money illusion effect, and loss aversion. The null hypothesis is 
formulated to be that decision makers base their investment decisions on traditional finance criteria such as award -
to-risk ratio and modern portfolio theory. Among the 103 stakeholders in Chinese power sector we interviewed 
during summer 2008, 32 were respondents at power generation companies who were directly involved in investment 
decisions, who we then  selected for this study on  behavioral economics.  
 
2. Representa tiveness  
Representativeness refers to judgment relying on stereotypes. When people try to determine the probability that 
outcome A was generated by a model B, they frequently demonstrate the representative heuristic which can result in 
severe bias (Kahneman and Tver sky, 1974).  Consider an example from our survey where stakeholders wer e asked 
how they assess the attractive ness of a  power investment . R ather than citing traditional investment criteri a ( such as 
estimated IRR, NPV, ROI), most decision-makers cited other factors such as that they were ‘large conventional 
thermal power projects’ , that they were ‘proposed by national authorities’  or ‘projects in rapidly developing regions’  
(Figure 1 ).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                   Figure 1 Preferred criteria for  
                                                                                                                                power generation project s as  
perceived by 32 firm -level  
decision makers ( where 1 is 
least important , 7 is most 
important ) and bars indicate 
percentage beli eving those to 
be more important than 
traditional economic measures 
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     In our test, w e asked stakeholders to what extent their decisions were based on specific criteria and asked to 
provid e a score from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates l east important  and 7 most important . 91% of  stakehold ers placed  
higher scores on thermal power project s being large as opposed to more  traditional project investment measu res, 
such as  NPV, IRR or ROI. In addition, project characteristics, such as whether they are in ‘rapidly developing area s’  
or ‘proposed by national authorities’ are seen as being more important than traditional financial measures by over 
80% of respondents. Modern portfolio theory only scored an average of 2.9 and only 29% decision -makers trusted it 
more than individual project financial measurements of NPV, IRR or ROI.  The emphasis on being ‘proposed by 
national authorities’ can also be explained by  the ‘endorsement effect’ , which will be discussed in section 6.  
     Perhaps more interestingly, when we sorted and deleveraged the actual return on equity (ROE) of power projects  
based on statistics from the past  three years, we found the actual data  does not demonstrate that large-thermal 
projects are good projects (as seen in Figure 2) . M edium -scale projects outperform  large power projects in both 
ROE as a proxy of profitability and equity to debt ratio as a proxy o f solvency.  Although projects in fast-growing 
areas did slightly outperform the others as shown Figure 3 , the overall differences are not statistically significant . 
The reasons behind these inconsistencies are probably due to th e fact that over 80% of deci sion -makers in this study 
we re focused on large projects and were only investing in fast-developing regions. T herefore, their past experiences 
or stereotypes may drive their investment decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Profitability and solvency of Chinese power projects  (2005 to 2007)  by scale (NBSC, 2008)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Profitability and solvency of Chinese power projects (2005 to 2007) by scale (NBSC, 2008) 
X. Liang, D. Reiner / Energy Procedia 1 (2009) 4495–4502 4497
4 Author name / Energy Procedia 00 ( 2008) 000 –000 
3. Overconfidence 
Overconfidence means that people tend to place too much confidence in their ability to predict, for example, by 
setting overly narrow bands in their confidence levels (Shefrin, 2000). Overconfident behavior may lead to surprises 
as stakeholders may underestimate the range of possible prices or project returns, and there will be a higher than 
normal probability of a return or prices outside the confidence interval.  
     The test was conducted from July to September 2007  when the underlying coal price fluctuated from 840 to 1100  
CNY/ton, and we illustrate this bias by ask ing decision -makers to predict the 90% confidence interval range of 
expected coal price s in 2009, using 5800 kcal coal exi t price  at Qinghuangd ao as the reference .   
    Respondents were asked what the range of coal prices would be in the coming year (2009). Among the 32 
decision-makers, the most pessimistic suggested a price of 400 to 600 CNY/ton, while the most optimistic estimate 
was 1200 to 1500  CNY/ton , as shown in Figure 4. Though we will not  be  able to calibrate the estimate until the 
actual  data is a vail able at the end of 2009, we found some interesting patterns regarding the scale of the interval. As 
shown in Figure 5 , the annual interval of coal price increased  from 2005 to 2008 ( where the 2008 range was based 
on Jan to Aug only ), and however over 6 0% of decision -makers offer an interval scale lower than that of 2005. Does 
it mean panelists expected lower annual volatility in 2009 or overconfidence in forecasting? If the overall trend of 
increasing volatility annually is true, most decision -makers have shown overconfidence with regard to  their abilities  
in predicting coal price.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Estimated range of coal exit price in 2009 according to  32 investment decision -makers in power generation  
companies, sorted by medium of range, referring to 5800 Kcal  coal in Qinghuangdao, unit: CNY/ton  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Perceived scale of expected coal exit price interval (expected year high – expected year low) in China 2009 
referring to 5800 Kcal  coal at Qinghuangdao, unit: CNY/ton . (Qinghuangdao Coal Exchange, 2008) 
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4. Anchoring 
Anchoring occurs when investors are unable to fully incorporate the impact of new information on projections  
(Kahneman et al , 1982). We found over two thirds of decision -makers are reluctant to revise their fore casts on 
project profitability in response to  changing operating conditions. Among the 10 respondents to identify  which  
issues are l ikely trigger revisions in forecasting a project’s profitability assuming the project remains 20 years 
lifetime.  As shown in Table 1, changes in the coal price and electricity despatch policy are most likely to trigger  
revisions of previous for ecasts for large coal -fired power project s, while electricity policy and national environment 
protection requirement s are seen as  more impor tant than carbon pric e or coal price for a large wind farm.  
 
 Large coal -fire power project (>600MW) Large wind power project (>30MW) 
Most Likely Coal price Electricity despatch policy  
 Electricity despatch policy  Environment protection  requirements  
 Environmental requirements Carbon price 
 New labour law Electricity market reform 
 Electricity market reform Coal price 
Least Likely Carbon price New labour law 
Table 1 Perceived most important factors possibly triggering revisions of a project’s econo mic forecast 
The other 22 respondents,  feeling reluctant to revise projections, are asked their reasons for not changing forecasting  
even though some primary costs or revenue factors have varied significantly . ‘Pitfalls in i nstitutional framework’ 
issues and ‘still confidence about previous projections’ are two most popular drivers of anchoring or relying heavily 
on previous information.  
 
5. Aversion-to -ambiguity & naïve diversification  
Aversion -to-ambiguity actually, fear of uncertainties, m eans if the odds are known investors are more likely to take  
the bet.   As Sherman (1974) suggested, the willingness of a subj ect to make about the same gamble whether 
individual knows the odds or not is here related to the psychological tolerance for ambiguity, and the less tolerant he 
is of ambiguity, the more likely he prefers to know the odds.  Therefore, aversion-to -ambiguity is distinguished from 
risk aversion, since aversion -to -ambiguity is a rejection of types of risk based partly on their certainty, not solely on 
the magnitude.   
      To test whether decision-makers fear of dealing with uncertainties, we first asked whether they will conside r 
invest ing in a fast-growing new business but the odds of successful is unknown. Only 16% claimed they may invest 
this venture.  When we poses the second question, if the odds of successful is 50:50 whether they will consider this 
new business,  47% said they would. This is probably an evidence of aversion -to-ambiguity we observed among 32 
stakeholders  in the Chinese power sector.  
     Thereafter, we asked 23 decision-makers (those who do not participate in any wind power project s) a qualitative 
question with regard to their reasons for not investing in wind power projects. The three overwhelmingly  popular 
explanations  (Figure 6) are regulatory uncertainties, technology uncertainties, and on-grid electricity pricing and 
despatch policy. In contrast with those three uncertainties, project profitability and capital availability constraints are 
much less commonly cited by stakeholders.  Most of respondents are not sure the approval process or bidding 
process to participate wind projects  in China. W e believe a more transparency bidding and regulatory system in 
which investors can easily assess associated risks , may encourage more investments in this sector.   
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Figure 6 Most popular constraints of in vesting in wind power projects cited  by 23 decision -makers from Chinese 
power firms not participating in any wind projects at the time of survey 
 
Benartzi (1998 ) finds many investors divide their money evenly across all the choices for their pension plan, such as 
the US 401(k) plan. Does this behavioral trait exist in the power investment? We found six out nine stakeholders  
who had investment experiences in wind power project claimed  investing wind power is a strategy to diversify 
existing power generation capacity in terms of technologies. Most of them also claimed that the current expected 
IRR on wind power projects were lower or identical comparing with large thermal power projects and operating and 
policy uncertainties are higher. They have no idea what’s the ideal proportion of wind or renewables in their 
generation capacity. Presumably, i f wind power projects have very similar common risk exposures with positive  
correlation s, the diversification may be not effective. However, we are currently unable to justify only based on 
available information.  
 
6. Endorsement effect  & framework dependence  
In the financial sector, endorsement effect is now frequently referred to the particip ants in defined contribution 
pension plan  who  simply assumed the investment alternatives provided by the sponsor or their employer are good 
investments. From Figure 1, 85% respondents believed ‘whether a project is proposed by national authorities’ was 
more important than traditional  projects economic measurements. After breaking down  our analysis  according to the  
ownership structure of  the power companies in which decision -makers serve, we found institutional framework may  
also significantly  affect decisio n-makers’ attitude towards national authorities’ endorsement (Figure 7) .   
 
 
                                 
                                                                                                            Figure 7 Perceptions of the effect of government 
endorsement on a good power generation project  
                                                                                                            perceived by 32 key decision  makers       
(1 indicated lowest importance, while 7 wa s  
highest importance and percentage of beli eving 
more important than traditional economic 
measures , with a comparison of government 
controlled firm and private or public-controlled 
firm  
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     Approximately  two thirds of respondents in our study is from state-controlled power companies  and the rest one 
third is from private or public -controlled power firms. Comparing with stakeholders from privat e or public -
controlled firms, decision makers  serving government-controlled firms offered a significantly high er average score 
(6.1 vs. 4.4) on the criteria of ‘proposed by national authorities’ which means that they even more firmly believed  
that  ‘projects implicitly endorsed  by national authori ti es were generally good projects ’ (Figure 7) . Therefore, there is 
not only the perceived general government -endorsem ent effects on decisions makers from both sectors, but  also 
institutional framework effects on gov ernment (state) - controlled power generation firms.   
 
7. Money illusion effect  
Investors usually recognize the need  to adjust for inflation but it is not a natural way for them to think, because 
people’s emotional reactions are driven by nominal values (Elden et al, 1997). We asked stakeholders whether they 
considered inflation in their decision -making process and how they might react to significant inflation changes. 
Surprisingly, although the production price index (PPI) was above 6% during the period of the survey, 
approximately one third of decision -makers in power companies claimed they primarily consider ed nominal returns, 
and slightly less than half assumed constant inflation in the model such as discount rate but will do nothing even if 
there is significant inflation change. Only 20% of stakeholders claimed they were actively adjusting their forecasts 
and operating plans to account for changes in  inflation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Distributios of stakeholders divided by preferred way  of dealing with inflation  
 
8. Loss aversion 
Loss aversion is exhibited when investors justify  opportunities based on the prospects of  gain or loss rather than in 
terms of uncertainties with respect to terminal wealth (Kahneman et al , 1979).  We asked stakeholders whether th ey 
would accept a sure loss of $10 million or a 50% chance of losing nothing and a 50% chance of losing $20 million. 
Interestingly, 27 out of the 32 (84%) decision makers chose the la tt er option, preferring the chance to recoup the full 
amount at the expense of the risk of a greater loss.  
     Afterwards, we asked  a more germane question: will you consider terminating a power project much earlier than 
scheduled which may result in a small loss when the economic prospect s of the project is highly uncertain  and may 
result in much greater losses . While the survey was being conducted, a large number of thermal p ower companies 
were losing money  because the coal price had increased dramatically  but the electricity price is constrained by the 
state to stay at  rela tively low l evels. Not a single respondent considered closing down a power plant to  mitigat e 
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future uncertainties and all we re reluctant to accept the certain  loss.  
9. Conclusions 
This paper provides a framework to analyze behavioral issues in investing lower carbon power projects , applying 
behavioral findings and patterns  well-perceived in financial market  or other sector. We found behavioral p atterns 
have significant influence to decision-makers in the Chinese power sector.  
     Most d ecision-makers in the study frequently relies on previous experiences or stereotypes, for example, over 
four fifths believed large scale, proposed by government and locating at fast growing regions are significant signs  
good projects. Besides, stakeholders are likely affected by over confidence traps, as a majority of them is probably 
providing an overly narrow band (lower volatility than usual ) of coal price.  
     We also observed approximatel y two thirds o f decision -makers are reluctant to incorporate new information in 
their forecast, implying their anchoring behavior. Uncertainties in technologies and regulations are primary barriers 
for investing wind power. On the other hand, achieve diversification consideration (no matter naive or not) can be a 
significant driver of a ne w lower carbon technology project within a large power firm.   
Chinese national  governments’ preference has significant  impact on project investment decisions, as good projects 
in decision -makers minds are implicitly endorsed by state authorities. Furthermore, stakeholders from state -
controlled power companies attached  more weight to national government’s choices.  
The inflation impact is considered by more than half stakeholders, but only 20% decision-makers claimed they 
would react actively to significant inflation change. With respect to loss aversion, a sure loss? a vast majority of  
decision-makers  would rather ‘play one more game to breakeven’.  
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